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a b s t r a c t
We show that every strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rule on a binary restricted domain
has binary support, and is a probabilistic mixture of strategy-proof and unanimous deterministic rules.
Examples of binary restricted domains are single-dipped domains, which are of interestwhen considering
the location of public bads. We also provide an extension to infinitely many alternatives.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Suppose that in choosing between red and white wine, half of
the dinner party is in favor of red wine while the other half prefers
whitewine. In this situation a deterministic (social choice) rule has
to choose one of the two alternatives, where a fifty–fifty lottery
seems to be more fair. In general, for every preference profile
a probabilistic rule selects a lottery over the set of alternatives.
Gibbard (1977) provides a characterization of all strategy-proof
probabilistic rules over the complete domain of preferences (see
also Sen, 2011). In particular, if in addition a rule is unanimous,
then it is a probabilistic mixture of deterministic rules. This result
implies that in order to analyze probabilistic rules it is sufficient to
study deterministic rules only.
In Peters et al. (2014) it is shown that if preferences are single-
peaked over a finite set of alternatives then every strategy-proof
and unanimous probabilistic rule is amixture of strategy-proof and
unanimous deterministic rules.1 The same is true for the multi-
dimensional domain with lexicographic preferences (Chatterji
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well as the editor and two reviewers for their invaluable suggestions. Support from
the European Union (EU project 660341) is gratefully acknowledged.∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: h.peters@maastrichtuniversity.nl (H. Peters),
souvik2004@gmail.com (S. Roy), t.storcken@maastrichtuniversity.nl (T. Storcken).
1 Ehlers et al. (2002) characterize such probabilistic rules for single-peaked
preferences where the set of alternatives is the real line.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.003
0304-4068/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.et al., 2012). But it is not necessarily true for all dictatorial domains
(Chatterji et al., 2014), in particular, there are domains where all
strategy-proof and unanimous deterministic rules are dictatorial
but not all strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules are
random dictatorships.
A binary restricted domain over two alternatives x and y is
a domain of preferences where the top alternative(s) of each
preference belong(s) to the set {x, y} (we allow for indifferences);
andmoreover, for every preferencewith top x there is a preference
with top y such that the only alternatives weakly preferred to y in
the former and x in the latter preference, are x and y.
Outstanding examples of binary restricted domains are do-
mains of single-dipped preferences with respect to a given
ordering of the alternatives. Single-dipped preferences are of
central interest in situations where the location of an obnoxious
facility (public bad) has to be determined by voting: think of de-
ciding on the location of a garbage dump along a road, such that
every inhabitant has a single dip (his house, or the school of his
children, etc.) and prefers a location for the garbage dump as far
away as possible from this dip. Peremans and Storcken (1999) have
shown the equivalence between individual and group strategy-
proofness in subdomains of single-dipped preferences. They char-
acterize a general class of strategy-proof deterministic rules. In
Manjunath (2014) the problemof locating a single public bad along
a line segmentwhen agents’ preferences are single-dipped, is stud-
ied. In particular, all strategy-proof and unanimous determinis-
tic rules are characterized. In Barberà et al. (2012) it is shown
that, when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the range
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most two alternatives. The paper also provides examples of sub-
domains admitting strategy-proof rules with larger ranges. Ayl-
lón and Caramuta (2016) consider group strategy-proofness under
single-dipped preferences when agents become satiated: above
a certain distance from their dips they become indifferent, and
thus they go beyond the binary restricted domain. Further works
on strategy-proofness under single-dipped preferences include
Öztürk et al. (2013, 2014), Lahiri et al. (forthcoming), and Chat-
terjee et al. (2016). For strong Nash implementation under single-
dipped preferences see Yamamura (2016). There is also a literature
on this topic when side payments are allowed, e.g., Lescop (2007)
or Sakai (2012).
In the present paper we show that every strategy-proof and
unanimous probabilistic rule over a binary restricted domain
with top alternatives x and y has binary support, i.e., for
every preference profile probability 1 is assigned to {x, y}. We
also show that if a strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic
rule has binary support then it can be written as a convex
combination of deterministic rules. Moreover, we present a
complete characterization of such rules, by using so-called
admissible collections of committees.
Closely related papers are Larsson and Svensson (2006) and
Picot and Sen (2012). Larsson and Svensson (2006) include a
characterization of all strategy-proof surjective deterministic rules
for the case of two alternatives with indifferences allowed. Their
Theorem 3 is close to our Theorem 3.9—our theorem is slightly
more general since we allow for more than two alternatives.
Picot and Sen (2012) show that every probabilistic rule is a
convex combination of deterministic rules if there are only two
alternatives and no indifferences are allowed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and definitions. Section 3 contains the main results,
Section 4 contains an application to single-dipped preference
domains, and Section 5 presents an extension to the case where
the number of alternatives may be infinite.
2. Preliminaries
Let A be a finite set of at least two alternatives and let N =
{1, . . . , n} be a finite set of at least two agents. Subsets of N are
called coalitions. Let W(A) be the set of (weak) preferences over
A.2 By P and I we denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts
of R ∈ W(A). For R ∈ W(A) by τ(R) we denote set of the first
ranked alternative(s) in R, i.e., τ(R) = {x ∈ A : xRy for all y ∈ A}.
In general, the notation D will be used for a set of admissible
preferences for an agent i ∈ N . As is clear from the notation, we
assume the same set of admissible preferences for every agent. A
preference profile, denoted by RN = (R1, . . . , Rn), is an element of
Dn, the Cartesian product of n copies of D . For a coalition S, RS
denotes the restriction of RN to S. For notational convenience we
often denote a singleton set {z} by z.
Definition 2.1. A deterministic rule (DR) is a function f : Dn → A.
Definition 2.2. A DR f is unanimous if f (RN) ∈ ∩ni=1 τ(Ri) for all
RN ∈ Dn such that ∩ni=1 τ(Ri) ≠ ∅.
Agent i ∈ N manipulates DR f at RN ∈ Dn via R′i if f (R′i, RN\i)
Pif (RN).
Definition 2.3. A DR f is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn,
and R′i ∈ D , i does not manipulate f at RN via R′i .
2 I.e., for all R ∈ W(A) and x, y, z ∈ A, we have xRy or yRx (completeness), and xRy
and yRz imply xRz (transitivity). Note that reflexivity (xRx for all x ∈ A) is implied.Definition 2.4. A probabilistic rule (PR) is a functionΦ : Dn →△A
where △A is the set of probability distributions over A. A strict PR
is a PR that is not a DR.
Observe that a deterministic rule can be identified with
a probabilistic rule by assigning probability 1 to the chosen
alternative.
For a ∈ A and RN ∈ Dn, Φa(RN) denotes the probability
assigned to a by Φ(RN). For B ⊆ A, we denote ΦB(RN) =
a∈BΦa(RN).
Definition 2.5. A PR Φ is unanimous if Φ∩ni=1 τ(Ri)(RN) = 1 for all
RN ∈ Dn such that ∩ni=1 τ(Ri) ≠ ∅.
Definition 2.6. For R ∈ D and x ∈ A, the upper contour set of x at
R is the set U(x, R) = {y ∈ X : yRx}. In particular, x ∈ U(x, R).
Agent i ∈ N manipulates PR Φ at RN ∈ Dn via R′i if ΦU(x,Ri)
(R′i, RN\i) > ΦU(x,Ri)(Ri, RN\i) for some x ∈ A.
Definition 2.7. A PR Φ is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn,
and R′i ∈ D , i does not manipulateΦ at RN via R′i .
In other words, strategy-proofness of a PR means that a
deviation results in a (first order) stochastically dominated lottery
for the deviating agent.
For PRs Φ j, j = 1, . . . , k and nonnegative numbers λj, j =
1, . . . , k, summing to 1, we define the PR Φ = kj=1Φ j by
Φx(RN) = kj=1 λjΦ jx(RN) for all RN ∈ Dn and x ∈ A. We call Φ
a convex combination of the PRsΦ j.
Definition 2.8. A domain D is said to be a deterministic extreme
point domain if every strategy-proof and unanimous PR on Dn
can be written as a convex combination of strategy-proof and
unanimous DRs onDn.
For a ∈ A, letDa = {R ∈ D : τ(R) = a}.
Definition 2.9. Let x, y ∈ A, x ≠ y. A domain D is a binary
restricted domain over {x, y} if
(i) for all R ∈ D , τ(R) ∈ {{x}, {y}, {x, y}},
(ii) for all a, b ∈ {x, y} with a ≠ b, and for each R ∈ Da, there
exists R′ ∈ Db such that U(b, R) ∩ U(a, R′) = {a, b}.
Condition (ii) in the definition of a binary restricted domain
is used in the proof of Proposition 3.5. There, we also provide an
example (see Remark 3.6) to show that this condition cannot be
dispensed with.
We conclude this section with the following definition.
Definition 2.10. Let x, y ∈ A, x ≠ y. A domainD is a binary support
domain over {x, y} if Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for every RN ∈ Dn and every
strategy-proof and unanimous PRΦ onDn.
3. Results
In this section we present the main results of this paper. First
we show that every binary support domain is a deterministic
extreme point domain (Corollary 3.3). Next we show that every
binary restricted domain is a binary support domain (Theorem3.4).
Consequently, every binary restricted domain is a deterministic
extremepoint domain (Corollary 3.8). Next,we characterize the set
of all strategy-proof and unanimous rules on such binary restricted
domains.
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First we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for a
domain to be a deterministic extreme point domain.
Theorem 3.1. A domain D is a deterministic extreme point domain
if and only if every strategy-proof and unanimous strict PR on Dn
is a convex combination of two other distinct strategy-proof and
unanimous PRs.
Proof. First, let D be an arbitrary domain. Observe that every PR
Φ can be identified with a vector in Rpm, where p is the number
of different preference profiles, i.e., the number of elements ofDn,
andm is the number of elements of A. Compactness and convexity
of a set of PRs are equivalent to convexity and compactness of the
associated subset of Rpm.
We show that the set of all strategy-proof and unanimous
probabilistic rules S overDn is compact and convex.
For convexity, let Φ ′,Φ ′′ ∈ S and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and let the
PR Φ be defined by Φ(RN) = αΦ ′(RN) + (1 − α)Φ ′′(RN) for all
RN ∈ Dn. Clearly, Φ is unanimous. For strategy-proofness, let
i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn and R′i ∈ D . Then, for all b ∈ A, by strategy-
proofness of Φ ′ and Φ ′′ we have Φ ′U(b,Ri)(R
′
i, RN\i) ≤ ΦU(b,Ri)(RN)
andΦ ′′U(b,Ri)(R
′
i, RN\i) ≤ Φ ′′U(b,Ri)(RN), so that
αΦ ′U(b,Ri)(R
′
i, RN\i)+ (1− α)Φ ′′U(b,Ri)(R′i, RN\i)
≤ αΦ ′U(b,Ri)(RN)+ (1− α)Φ ′′U(b,Ri)(RN),
hence ΦU(b,Ri)(R
′
i, RN\i) ≤ ΦU(b,Ri)(RN). Thus, Φ is strategy-proof,
and S is convex.
For closedness, consider a sequence Φk, k ∈ N, in S such that
limk→∞Φk = Φ , i.e., for all x ∈ A and RN ∈ Dn, limk→∞Φkx (RN) =
Φx(RN). It is easy to see that Φ is unanimous. Suppose that Φ
were not strategy-proof. Then there exist i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn and
R′i ∈ D such that for some b ∈ A, ΦU(b,Ri)(R′i, RN\i) > ΦU(b,Ri)(RN).
This means there exists k ∈ N such that ΦkU(b,Ri)(R′i, RN\i) >
ΦkU(b,Ri)
(RN). This contradicts strategy-proofness of Φk. So, S is
closed. Clearly, S is bounded. Thus, it is compact.
SinceS is compact and convex, by the TheoremofKrein–Milman
(e.g., Rockafellar, 1970) it is the convex hull of its (non-empty set
of) extreme points. Now, for the if-part of the theorem, for a do-
main D satisfying the premise, no strict PR is an extreme point.
Thus,D is a deterministic extreme point domain. In fact, it is also
easy to see that every strategy-proof and unanimous deterministic
rule is an extreme point of S.
For the only-if part, let D be a deterministic extreme point
domain and let Φ be a strategy-proof and unanimous strict PR on
Dn. Then there are λ1, . . . , λk, k ≥ 2, with λi > 0 for all i =
1, . . . , k and
k
i=1 λi = 1, and strategy-proof and unanimous DRs
f 1, . . . , f k on Dn with f i ≠ f j for i ≠ j, such that Φ = ki=1 λif i.
We define Φ ′ = ki=2 λi1−λ1 f i. Then Φ = (1 − λ1)Φ ′ + λ1f 1, and
Φ ′ and f 1 are distinct strategy-proof and unanimous PRs different
fromΦ . 
In the following theorem we show that if a strategy-proof and
unanimous strict PR has binary support, then it can be written as
a convex combination of two other strategy-proof and unanimous
PRs.
Theorem 3.2. Let Φ : Dn → ∆(A) be a strategy-proof and unani-
mous strict PR and let x, y ∈ A such that Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈
Dn. Then there exist strategy-proof and unanimous PRs Φ ′,Φ ′′ with
Φ ′ ≠ Φ ′′ such that Φ(RN) = 12Φ ′(RN)+ 12Φ ′′(RN) for all RN ∈ Dn.Proof. Note thatΦ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for allRN ∈ Dn implies thatΦ(RN)
is completely determined by Φx(RN) for all RN ∈ Dn. Since Φ is a
strict PR, there exists R′N ∈ Dn such that Φx(R′N) = p ∈ (0, 1). Let
C = {RN ∈ Dn : Φx(RN) ≠ p}. Since C is finite set, there is an
ϵ ∈ (0, p) such that for all RN ∈ C , Φx(RN) ∉ [p − ϵ, p + ϵ]. We
defineΦ ′ andΦ ′′ with support {x, y} by
Φ ′x(RN) =

Φx(RN) if RN ∈ C
Φx(RN)+ ϵ otherwise and
Φ ′′x (RN) =

Φx(RN) if RN ∈ C
Φx(RN)− ϵ otherwise.
Clearly, Φ ′ ≠ Φ ′′ and Φ(RN) = 12Φ ′(RN) + 12Φ ′′(RN) for all
RN ∈ Dn. Unanimity of Φ ′ and Φ ′′ follows from unanimity of Φ .
We show thatΦ ′ andΦ ′′ are strategy-proof. We consider onlyΦ ′,
the proof for Φ ′′ is analogous. Let i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn and Qi ∈ D .
Write QN = (Qi, RN\i). We consider the following cases.
Case 1 RN ,QN ∉ C . Then Φ ′x(RN) = p + ϵ = Φ ′x(QN). So i does not
manipulateΦ ′ at RN via Qi.
Case 2 RN ,QN ∈ C . ThenΦ ′x(RN) = Φx(RN) andΦ ′x(QN) = Φx(QN).
Since i does not manipulate Φ at RN via Qi, this implies that i does
not manipulateΦ ′ at RN via Qi.
Case 3 RN ∉ C , QN ∈ C . Then Φ ′x(RN) = Φx(RN) + ϵ and
Φ ′x(QN) = Φx(QN) ∉ [Φx(RN) − ϵ,Φx(RN) + ϵ]. If xPiy (where
Pi is the asymmetric part of Ri), then by strategy-proofness of Φ ,
Φ ′x(QN) = Φx(QN) ≤ Φx(RN) = Φ ′x(RN) − ϵ < Φ ′x(RN), so that
i does not manipulate Φ ′ at RN via Qi. If yPix, then by strategy-
proofness of Φ , Φ ′x(QN) = Φx(QN) ≥ Φx(RN) + ϵ = Φ ′x(RN), so
that i does not manipulateΦ ′ at RN via Qi.
Case 4 RN ∈ C , QN ∉ C . If xPiy then by strategy-proofness ofΦ and
the choice of ϵ, Φ ′x(QN) = Φx(QN) + ϵ ≤ (Φx(RN) − ϵ) + ϵ =
Φx(RN) = Φ ′x(RN), so that i does not manipulate Φ ′ at RN via Qi.
If yPix, then by strategy-proofness of Φ , Φ ′y(QN) = Φy(QN) − ϵ ≤
Φy(RN)− ϵ = Φ ′y(RN)− ϵ < Φ ′y(RN), so that i does not manipulate
Φ ′ at RN via Qi. 
Theorems 3.2 and 3.1 imply the following result.
Corollary 3.3. Every binary support domain is a deterministic
extreme point domain.
3.2. Binary restricted domains are binary support domains
The main result of this subsection is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Every binary restricted domain is a binary support
domain.
We first prove the result for two agents and then use induction
to prove it for an arbitrary number of agents.
Proposition 3.5. LetD be a binary restricted domain over {x, y}, and
let Φ : D2 → △A be a strategy-proof and unanimous PR. Then
Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ D2.
Proof. By unanimity ofΦ it is sufficient to consider the casewhere
RN = (R1, R2)with R1 ∈ Dx and R2 ∈ Dy.
First assume that U(y, R1) ∩ U(x, R2) = {x, y}. Suppose that
ΦB(RN) > 0 forB = A\U(y, R1). Then agent 1manipulates atRN via
some R′1 ∈ Dy, since by unanimity Φy(R′1, R2) = 1 and y is strictly
preferred to (every element of) A \ U(y, R1) at the preference R1 of
agent 1. Hence, we must have ΦB(RN) = 0 for B = A \ U(y, R1).
Similarly one shows that ΦB′(RN) = 0 for B′ = A \ U(x, R2). Since
U(y, R1) ∩ U(x, R2) = {x, y}, we haveΦ{x,y}(RN) = 1.
Next, suppose that U(y, R1) ∩ U(x, R2) ≠ {x, y}. This, by the
definition of a binary restricted domain, means that there exist
R′1 ∈ Dx and R′2 ∈ Dy such that U(y, R1) ∩ U(x, R′2) = {x, y} and
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Φ{x,y}(R1, R′2) = 1 and Φ{x,y}(R′1, R2) = 1. Let Φx(R1, R′2) = ϵ and
Φx(R′1, R2) = ϵ′. Since R1, R′1 ∈ Dx and R2, R′2 ∈ Dy, strategy-
proofness implies Φx(R′1, R
′
2) = Φx(R1, R′2) = ϵ and Φy(R′1, R′2) =
Φy(R′1, R2) = 1 − ϵ′. This means Φ{x,y}(R′1, R′2) = ϵ + 1 − ϵ′,
which implies ϵ ≤ ϵ′. By a similar argument it follows that ϵ′ ≤ ϵ.
Hence, ϵ = ϵ′. Finally, again since R1, R′1 ∈ Dx and R2, R′2 ∈ Dy, we
have by strategy-proofness that Φx(R1, R2) = Φx(R′1, R2) = ϵ and
Φy(R1, R2) = Φy(R1, R′2) = 1 − ϵ, and hence Φ{x,y}(R1, R2) = 1,
completing the proof. 
Remark 3.6. Condition (ii) in Definition 2.9 of a binary restricted
domain cannot be omitted. Let A = {x, y, z}, N = {1, 2}, and
let D = {R, R′} ⊆ W(A) with xPzPy and yP ′zP ′x (P and P ′ are
the asymmetric parts of R and R′, respectively). Hence, D is not
a binary restricted domain over {x, y}, since (ii) in Definition 2.9 is
not fulfilled. Let (α, β, γ ) ∈ ∆(A) be the lottery with probabilities
on x, y, and z, respectively. Define the PR Φ by: Φ(RN) = (1, 0, 0)
if RN = (R, R), Φ(RN) = (0, 1, 0) if RN = (R′, R′), and Φ(RN) =
( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) in the two other cases. Then clearly Φ is unanimous and
strategy-proof. Hence,D is not a binary support domain.
The following proposition treats the case with more than two
agents.
Proposition 3.7. Let n ≥ 3, let D be binary restricted domain over
{x, y}, and let Φ : Dn →△A be a strategy-proof and unanimous PR.
ThenΦ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn.
Proof. As before, N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents. We prove the
result by induction. Assume that the proposition holds for all sets
with k < n agents.
Let N∗ = {1, 3, . . . , n} and define the PR g : Dn−1 → △A for
the set of agents N∗ as follows: For all RN∗ = (R1, R3, . . . , Rn) ∈
Dn−1,
g(R1, R3, . . . , Rn) = Φ(R1, R1, R3, . . . , Rn).
Claim 1. g{x,y}(RN∗) = 1 for all RN∗ ∈ Dn−1.
To prove this claim, first observe that g inherits unanimity from
Φ . We show that g also inherits strategy-proofness. It is easy to see
that agents other than 1 do not manipulate g since Φ is strategy-
proof. Let (R1, R3, . . . , Rn) ∈ Dn−1 and Q1 ∈ D . For all b ∈ A, we
have
gU(b,R1)(R1, R3, . . . , Rn) = ΦU(b,R1)(R1, R1, R3, . . . , Rn)
≥ ΦU(b,R1)(Q1, R1, R3, . . . , Rn)
≥ ΦU(b,R1)(Q1,Q1, R3, . . . , Rn)
= gU(b,R1)(Q1, R3, . . . , Rn),
where the inequalities follow from strategy-proofness of Φ . The
proof of Claim 1 is now complete by the induction hypothesis.3
Thus, by Claim 1, we have Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn with
R1 = R2. Our next claim shows that the same holds if τ(R1) =
τ(R2).
Claim 2. Let RN be a preference profile such that τ(R1) = τ(R2).
ThenΦ{x,y}(RN) = 1.
To prove this claim, first suppose that τ(R1) = τ(R2) = {x, y}.
Then, if Φ{x,y}(RN) < 1, player 1 manipulates at RN via R2 since
3 We have included the proof of Claim 1 for completeness. It can also be found in
Sen (2011).by Claim 1, Φ{x,y}(R2, R2, RN\{1,2}) = 1. Now consider the case
τ(R1) = τ(R2) ∈ {x, y}, say τ(R1) = τ(R2) = x. By Claim 1
we have Φ{x,y}(R1, R1, RN\{1,2}) = Φ{x,y}(R2, R2, RN\{1,2}) = 1.
Moreover, since τ(R1) = τ(R2) = xwe have by strategy-proofness
Φx(R1, R1, RN\{1,2}) = Φx(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) = Φx(R2, R2, RN\{1,2}) =
ϵ (say).
Since D is a binary restricted domain, if τ(Ri) ≠ y for all
i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, then by unanimityΦ{x,y}(RN) = Φx(RN) = 1, and we
are done. Now suppose there is i ∈ N \ {1, 2} such that τ(Ri) = y.
Let R ∈ D be such that τ(R) = y and U(x, R) ∩ U(y, R1) = {x, y}.
Such an R exists since D is a binary restricted domain. Consider
the preference profile R¯N\{1,2} of the agents in N \ {1, 2} defined as
follows: for all i ∈ N \ {1, 2}
R¯i =

R if τ(Ri) = y
Ri otherwise.
By Claim 1, Φ{x,y}(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}) = Φ{x,y}(R2, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) =
1. Since τ(R1) = τ(R2) = x, we have by strategy-proofness
Φx(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}) = Φx(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = Φx(R2, R2, R¯N\{1,2}).
We show Φx(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}) = ϵ. First we claim that Φy(R1, R1,
RN\{1,2}) = Φy(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}). To see this, consider a player
i ∈ N \ {1, 2} such that Ri ≠ R¯i. Then τ(Ri) = τ(R¯i) = y,
hence by strategy-proofness we have Φy(R1, R1, Ri, RN\{1,2,i}) =
Φy(R1, R1, R¯i, RN\{1,2,i}). By repeating this argument, Φy(R1,
R1, RN\{1,2}) = Φy(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}). Hence, since Φ{x,y}(R1, R1,
R¯N\{1,2}) = 1, we obtainΦx(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}) = ϵ.
Using similar logic it follows that Φy(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) =
Φy(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}). We complete the proof by showing
Φy(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1−ϵ. For this, sinceΦx(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = ϵ,
it suffices to show that Φ{x,y}(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1. Suppose that
ΦB(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) > 0 for B = A \ U(y, R1). Then agent 1 manip-
ulates at (R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) via R2 since Φ{x,y}(R2, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1.
Thus, ΦU(y,R1)(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1. Next we show that ΦU(x,R)
(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1. If not, consider i ∈ N \ {1, 2} such that
R¯i = R. Let R′i be such that τ(R′i) = x. Then by strategy-proofness
ΦU(x,R)(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) ≥ ΦU(x,R)(R1, R2, R′i, R¯N\{1,2,i}). By sequen-
tially changing the preferences of the players in N \ {1, 2}with y at
the top in thismannerwe construct a preference profile Rˆ such that
τ(Rˆi) = x for all i ∈ N and ΦU(x,R)(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) ≥ ΦU(x,R)(Rˆ) =
1. HenceΦU(x,R)(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1.
SinceΦU(y,R1)(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1,ΦU(x,R)(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1,
andU(y, R1)∩U(x, R) = {x, y}, wehaveΦ{x,y}(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) = 1.
This completes the proof of Claim 2.
We can now complete the proof of the proposition. Let RN ∈ Dn
be an arbitrary preference profile. We show that Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1.
In view of Claim 2, we may assume τ(R1) ≠ τ(R2). Note that if
τ(Ri) = {x, y} for some i ∈ {1, 2} andΦA\{x,y}(RN) > 0, then agent
imanipulates at RN via Rj, where j ∈ {1, 2}, j ≠ i, since by Claim 1
we haveΦ{x,y}(Rj, Rj, RN\{1,2}) = 1. Sowemay assumewithout loss
of generality that τ(R1) = x and τ(R2) = y.
Suppose U(y, R1) ∩ U(x, R2) = {x, y}. If ΦA\U(x,R2)(RN) >
0, then agent 2 manipulates at RN via R1 since, by Claim 1,
Φ{x,y}(R1, R1, RN\{1,2}) = 1. Thus, ΦU(x,R2)(RN) = 1, and similarly
one provesΦU(y,R1)(RN) = 1. Together with U(y, R1) ∩ U(x, R2) ={x, y}, this impliesΦ{x,y}(RN) = 1.
Finally, suppose U(y, R1) ∩ U(x, R2) ≠ {x, y}. Since D is
a binary restricted domain there exist R′1 ∈ Dx and R′2 ∈
Dy such that U(y, R1) ∩ U(x, R′2) = {x, y} and U(y, R′1) ∩
U(x, R2) = {x, y}. Since τ(R1) = τ(R′1) = x and τ(R2) =
τ(R′2) = y, by strategy-proofness we have Φx(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) =
Φx(R′1, R2, RN\{1,2}) and Φy(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) = Φy(R1, R′2, RN\{1,2}).
By a similar argument as in the last paragraph of proof of
Proposition 3.5 we haveΦx(R1, R′2, RN\{1,2}) = Φx(R′1, R2, RN\{1,2}).
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Φ{x,y}(R1, R′2, RN\{1,2}) = 1 sinceU(y, R1)∩U(x, R′2) = {x, y}, which
completes the proof of the proposition. 
Theorem 3.4 now follows from Propositions 3.5 and 3.7.
Moreover, we have the following consequence of Theorem 3.4 and
Corollary 3.3.
Corollary 3.8. Every binary restricted domain is a deterministic
extreme point domain.
3.3. Characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous rules
In this subsection we give a characterization of all strategy-
proof and unanimous PRs on a binary restricted domain. In view
of Corollary 3.8, it will be sufficient to give a characterization of
strategy-proof and unanimous DRs on a binary restricted domain.
Throughout this subsection letD be a binary restricted domain
over {x, y}. For RN ∈ Dn, by Nx(RN) we denote the set of agents
i ∈ N such that τ(Ri) = x; by Nxy(RN) the set of agents i ∈ N such
that τ(Ri) = {x, y}; and we define
I(RN) = {QN ∈ Dn : Nxy(QN) = Nxy(RN)
and Ri = Qi for every i ∈ Nxy(RN)}.
Thus, I(RN) is the (equivalence) class of all preference profiles
that share with RN the set of agents who are indifferent between x
and y and have the same preference as in RN .
For RN ∈ DN a committee W(RN) is a set of subsets of N such
that:
(1) If Nxy(RN) = N thenW(RN) = ∅ orW(RN) = {∅}.
(2) If Nxy(RN) ≠ N thenW(RN) ⊆ 2N\Nxy(RN ) satisfies
(i) ∅ ∉ W(RN) and N \ Nxy(RN) ∈ W(RN),
(ii) for all S, T ⊆ N \ Nxy(RN), if S ⊆ T and S ∈ W(RN), then
T ∈ W(RN).
In case (2) in the above definition, a committee is a simple game,
elements ofW(RN) are calledwinning coalitions, and other subsets
of N \ Nx,y(RN) are called losing coalitions.
A collection of committees W = {W(RN) : RN ∈ Dn} is
an admissible collection of committees (ACC) if the following three
conditions hold:
(a) For all RN ,QN ∈ Dn, if QN ∈ I(RN) thenW(QN) = W(RN).
(b) For all RN ∈ Dn, i ∈ N \ Nxy(RN), R′i ∈ D such that τ(R′i) ={x, y}, and C ∈ W(RN), if i ∉ C , then C ∈ W(RN\i, R′i).
(c) For all RN ∈ Dn, i ∈ N \ Nxy(RN), R′i ∈ D such that τ(R′i) ={x, y}, and C ∉ W(RN), if i ∈ C , then C \ {i} ∉ W(RN\i, R′i).
Thus, a collection of committees is admissible if (a) each
committee depends only on the set of indifferent agents and their
preferences; (b) if a coalition iswinning and an agent not belonging
to it becomes indifferent, then the coalition stays winning; and
(c) if a coalition is losing and an agent belonging to it becomes
indifferent, then the coalition without that agent stays losing.
Observe that (a), (b), and (c) are trivially fulfilled if Nxy(RN) = N ,
i.e., if all agents are indifferent. In particular, in that case I(RN) ={RN}.
With an ACC W we associate a DR fW as follows: for every
RN ∈ Dn,
fW (RN) =

x if Nx(RN) ∈ W(RN)
y if Nx(RN) ∉ W(RN).
We now show that every strategy-proof and unanimous DR is
of the form fW . We just outline the proof since it is rather standard,
and, moreover, the theorem is almost equivalent to Theorem 3 in
Larsson and Svensson (2006). A (nonessential) difference is that the
last mentioned result is formulated for the case where A = {x, y},
so that all preference profiles with the same indifferent agents are
equivalent, making our condition (a) on an ACC redundant.Theorem 3.9. Let D be a binary restricted domain. A DR f onDn is
strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if there is an ACC W such
that f = fW .
Proof. For the only-if part, let f be a strategy-proof and unanimous
DR. For each RN ∈ Dn we define the set Wf (RN) of coalitions
as follows. If Nxy(RN) = N then Wf (RN) = {∅} if f (RN) = x
and Wf (RN) = ∅ otherwise. If Nxy(RN) ≠ N then for every C ⊆
N \ Nxy(RN), C ∈ Wf (RN) if and only if there is a QN ∈ I(RN) such
that f (QN) = x and C = Nx(QN). ThenWf (RN) is a committee for
each RN ∈ DN by unanimity and strategy-proofness of f . Also, the
collectionWf = {Wf (RN) : RN ∈ Dn} is an ACC: (a) follows directly
bydefinition of the committeesWf (RN); and (b) and (c) follow from
unanimity and strategy-proofness of f . Finally, it is straightforward
to check that f = fWf .
For the if-part, let W be an ACC. Then it is easy to check that
f = fW is strategy-proof and unanimous. 
ByCorollary 3.8 and Theorem3.9weobtain the following result.
Corollary 3.10. Let D be a binary restricted domain. A PR f onDn is
strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it is a convex combination
of DRs of the form f = fW for ACCsW .
Remark 3.11. The set of winning coalitions W(RN) may indeed
depend on the preference profile of the indifferent agents, i.e., the
agents in I(RN). Here is an example. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, A ={x, y, v, w} and define: W(RN) = {{1, 3},N} if Nxy(RN) = ∅;
W(RN) = {{1, 3}} if Nxy(RN) = {2}; W(RN) = {{2, 3}} if
Nxy(RN) = {1}; W(RN) = {{1, 2}} if Nxy(RN) = {3} and vR3w;
W(RN) = {{1}, {1, 2}} if Nxy(RN) = {3} and wP3v; andW(RN) ={∅} if Nxy(RN) = N . Then it is straightforward to verify that fW is
strategy-proof and unanimous.
4. Application to single-dipped preferences
In this section we apply our results to single-dipped domains
and characterize all strategy-proof and unanimous PRs on such a
domain.
Definition 4.1. A preference of agent i ∈ N , Ri ∈ W(A), is single-
dipped on A relative to a linear ordering≻ of the set of alternatives
if
(i) Ri has a unique minimal element d(Ri), the dip of Ri and
(ii) for all y, z ∈ A, [d(Ri) ≽ y ≻ z or z ≻ y ≽ d(Ri)] ⇒ zPiy.
Let D≻ denote the set of all single-dipped preferences relative
to the ordering ≻, and let R≻ ⊆ D≻. Clearly D≻ is a binary
restricted domain. Moreover, R≻ is a binary restricted domain if
it satisfies condition (ii) in Definition 2.9, the definition of a binary
restricted domain. Hence, by Corollary 3.8 and Theorem 3.9 we
obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.2. Let ≻ be a linear ordering over A and let R≻ ⊆ D≻
satisfy (ii) in Definition 2.9. Then a PR on Rn≻ is strategy-proof and
unanimous if and only if it is a convex combination of DRs on Rn≻ of
the form f = fW for ACCsW .
Consider a single-dipped domain where the alternatives are
assumed to be equidistant from each other and preference is
consistent with the distance from the dip. More precisely, when
the distance of an alternative from the dip of an agent is higher
than that of another alternative, the agent prefers the former
alternative to the latter. Call such a domain a ‘distance single-
dipped domain’. If ties between equidistant alternatives are broken
in both ways, then such a domain is again a binary restricted
domain, and Corollary 4.2 applies. However, if ties are broken in
favor of the left side (or of the right side) only, then the domain is no
longer a binary restricted domain. Indeed, in Example 4.3 we show
that there exists a strategy-proof and unanimous PR that does not
have binary support.
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sented in the table below. There are two agents and four alterna-
tives: think of the alternatives as located on a line in the ordering
x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 with equal distances. Ties are always bro-
ken in favor of the left alternative. It is not hard to verify that the
PR given in the table (probabilities in the order x1, x2, x3, x4, and
0 < β < α < 1, 0 < γ < ϵ < 1 arbitrary) is strategy-proof and
unanimous, but does not have binary support.
1/2 x1x2x3x4 x4x3x2x1 x4x1x3x2 x1x2x4x3
x1x2x3x4 (1, 0, 0, 0) (α −
β, β, 0, 1− α)
(α, 0, 0, 1− α) (1, 0, 0, 0)
x4x3x2x1 (ϵ −
γ , γ , 0, 1− ϵ)
(0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0, 1) (ϵ−γ , γ , 0, 1−ϵ)
x4x1x3x2 (ϵ, 0, 0, 1− ϵ) (0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0, 1) (ϵ, 0, 0, 1− ϵ)
x1x2x4x3 (1, 0, 0, 0) (α −
β, β, 0, 1− α)
(α, 0, 0, 1− α) (1, 0, 0, 0)
Remark 4.4. Other examples of binary restricted domains are
single-peaked domains where each peak can only be one of two
fixed adjacent alternatives, or certain single-crossing domainswith
only two alternatives that can serve as top alternative. These
domains, however, are of limited interest within the single-peaked
and single-crossing domains, respectively.
Of course, there are binary restricted domains which are
much larger than and considerably different from single-dipped
domains—anobvious example is the domain of all preferenceswith
x or y or both on top, or any subdomain including a preferencewith
x on top and y second and a preference with y on top and x second.
5. Infinitely many alternatives
In this section we assume that the set of alternatives A may be
an infinite set, for instance a closed interval in R. We assume A to
be endowedwith a σ -algebra of measurable sets; only preferences
in W(A) for which the upper contour sets U(x, R), x ∈ A, are
measurable, are considered. A PR Φ assigns to an admissible
preference profile a probability distribution over the measurable
space A, hence a probability to every measurable set. The set of all
such probability distributions will still be denoted as ∆(A). For a
measurable set B ⊆ A, ΦB(RN) denotes the probability assigned
to B if the preference profile is RN . All the introduced concepts
and definitions extend in a straightforward manner to this setting.
In particular, Definitions 2.1–2.7, 2.9 and 2.10 are literally the
same. Also Propositions 3.5 and 3.7 are still valid, and therefore
Theorem 3.4 still holds: a binary restricted domain over {x, y}
(x, y ∈ A) is a binary support domain. The purpose of this section is
to provide a characterization of all strategy-proof and unanimous
PRs on a binary restricted domain.
LetD be a binary restricted domain over {x, y} for some x, y ∈
A. We use some of the notations introduced in Section 3.3. For
RN ∈ Dn with Nxy(RN) = N we let h(RN) = h(RN)(∅) ∈ [0, 1] and
for RN ∈ Dn with Nxy(RN) ≠ N we let h(RN) : 2N\Nxy(RN ) → [0, 1]
satisfy h(RN)(∅) = 0, h(RN)(N \ Nxy(RN)) = 1, and h(RN)(C) ≤
h(RN)(C ′) for all C, C ′ ⊆ N \ Nxy(RN) with C ⊆ C ′; we assume,
moreover, that h(QN) = h(RN)whenever QN ∈ I(RN) and that
h(RN)(C \ i) ≤ h(R′N)(C \ i) ≤ h(RN)(C)
whenever i ∈ N \ Nxy(RN), R′N = (RN\i, R′i) for some R′i with
τ(R′i) = {x, y}, and C ⊆ N \ Nxy(RN) with i ∈ C . Observe
that such an h generalizes the concept of an admissible collection
of committees: we call h a probabilistic admissible collection of
committees (PACC). For RN ∈ Dn with Nxy(RN) ≠ N , the number
h(RN)(C) can be interpreted as the probability that a coalition C
is winning given a profile with Nxy(RN) as the set of agents who
are indifferent between x and y and having RNxy(RN ) as preferenceprofile; specifically, if C is the set of agents with x on top, then this
probability will be assigned to x. If Nxy(RN) = N , then h(RN) =
h(RN)(∅) is the probability assigned to x.
We say that a PR Φ on Dn is associated with a PACC h if (i)
Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn; (ii) Φx(RN) = h(RN)(Nx(RN)) for
all RN ∈ Dn.
We have the following result.
Theorem 5.1. Let D be a binary restricted domain over {x, y}. A PR
Φ onDn is strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it is associated
with a PACC.
Proof. For the if-part, let PR Φ be associated with a PACC h. We
show thatΦ is unanimous and strategy-proof.
We first show that Φ is unanimous. Consider a profile RN ∈
Dn such that ∩i∈N τ(Ri) ≠ ∅. If τ(Ri) = {x, y} for all i ∈ N
then unanimity holds by definition. Suppose ∩i∈N τ(Ri) = x. Then
Nx(RN) = N \ Nxy(RN). Since h(RN)(N \ Nxy(RN)) = 1, we have
Φx(RN) = 1. If ∩i∈N τ(Ri) = y then Nx(RN) = ∅ which implies
Φx(RN) = h(RN)(∅) = 0. So,Φy(RN) = 1.
Next we show thatΦ is strategy-proof. Consider a profile RN ∈
Dn. We only need to consider i ∈ N \ Nxy(RN). Let R′i ∈ D and
write R′N = (RN\i, R′i). We distinguish four cases and each time
show that i cannot improve byR′i . (i) If τ(Ri) = x and τ(R′i) = y then
Φx(RN) = h(RN)(Nx(RN)) ≥ h(R′N)(Nx(RN)\i) = h(R′N)(Nx(R′N)) =
Φx(R′N) by definition of h. (ii) If τ(Ri) = y and τ(R′i) = x then
Φx(RN) = h(RN)(Nx(RN)) ≤ h(R′N)(Nx(RN)) = h(R′N)(Nx(R′N)) =
Φx(R′N). This implies Φy(RN) ≥ Φy(R′N). (iii) If τ(Ri) = x and
τ(R′i) = {x, y}, then, since Nx(RN) \ i = Nx(R′i, RN\i), we have
Φx(RN) = h(RN)(Nx(RN)) ≥ h(R′N)(Nx(R′N)) = Φx(R′N). (iv) Finally,
if τ(Ri) = y and τ(R′i) = {x, y}, then Φx(RN) = h(RN)(Nx(RN)) ≤
h(R′N)(Nx(R
′
N)) = Φx(R′N), which implies Φy(R′N) ≤ Φy(RN). This
completes the proof thatΦ is strategy-proof.
For the only-if part, consider a unanimous and strategy-proof
PR Φ on Dn. Then Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn by (the
modified version of) Theorem 3.4. We show that Φ is associated
with a PACC h. If RN ∈ Dn with Nxy(RN) = N , then we define
h(RN) = h(RN)(∅) = Φx(RN). Now let RN ∈ Dn with Nxy(RN) ≠ N .
By strategy-proofness,Φ(QN) = Φ(RN) for all QN ∈ Dn with QN ∈
I(RN) and Nx(QN) = Nx(RN). Therefore, we can define h(RN)(C) =
Φx(QN) for any QN ∈ I(RN) such that C = Nx(QN). By unanimity
of Φ , h(RN)(∅) = 0 and h(RN)(N \ Nxy(RN)) = 1. By strategy-
proofness, h(RN)(C) ≤ h(RN)(C ′) for all C, C ′ ⊆ N \ Nxy(RN) with
C ⊆ C ′.
Clearly, h(QN) = h(RN)whenever RN ∈ Dn and QN ∈ I(RN).
Let RN ∈ Dn, i ∈ N \ Nxy(RN), R′N = (RN\i, R′i) for some R′i
with τ(R′i) = {x, y}, and C ⊆ N \ Nxy(RN) with i ∈ C . Consider
QN ∈ I(RN) with Nx(QN) = C . Then by strategy-proofness we
have h(RN)(C) = Φx(QN) ≥ Φx(QN\i, R′i) = h(RN\i, R′i)(C \ i) =
h(R′N)(C \ i). Finally, consider VN ∈ I(RN) with Nx(VN) = C \ i.
Again by strategy-proofness we obtain h(RN)(C \ i) = Φx(VN) ≤
Φx(VN\i, R′i) = h(RN\i, R′i)(C \ i) = h(R′N)(C \ i). 
We conclude the paper with some thoughts about extending
Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.3 to the case of infinitely many
alternatives. As to extending Theorem 3.1, which states that a
domain is a deterministic extreme point domain if and only if
each strategy-proof and unanimous strict probabilistic rule can
be written as a convex combination of two other strategy-proof
and unanimous probabilistic rules, for the infinite case one may
try and find a suitable topology on the set of all such rules so
that it becomes a convex and compact subset of a topological
vector space. Then, one could apply a topological version of
the Krein–Milman Theorem (e.g., Theorem III.4.1 in Barvinok,
2002) and conclude that each strategy-proof and unanimous
probabilistic rule is in the closure of the convex hull of the
strategy-proof and unanimous deterministic rules. This, however,
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the exact analogue of Theorem 3.1. Next, Corollary 3.3 states that
for the case of finitely many alternatives every binary support
domain is a deterministic extreme point domain. This is a direct
consequence of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, where the latter theorem
states that every strategy-proof and unanimous strict probabilistic
rule assigning positive probability to only two alternatives x and
y, can be written as a convex combination of two other such
rules. Again, extending this theorem to the case of infinitely many
alternatives does not seem to be a sinecure: the proof for the
finite case heavily uses the fact that if a probability p ∈ (0, 1)
is assigned to x at some preference profile, then we can find an
interval around p such that at each other profile either probability
p is assigned to x or some probability outside this interval. A proof
along this line seems to break down if there are infinitely many
alternatives.
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